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recommendations regarding feasibility and the amount of water
necessary to accomplish the homeland purpose." Rather than set
forth a clear test to quantify water rights, the court provided a list of
factors, consistent with the idea of a reservation serving as a permanent
homeland, with which to determine the minimal amount of water
necessary for an Indian reservation. These factors include a tribe's
history and cultural practices, geography and topography of the
reservation, groundwater availability, and past water use.
The state litigants argued their water rights would decrease due to
the proposed system of allocation to Indian reservations. The Arizona
Supreme Court rejected their argument, holding, "such a minimalist
approach demonstrates appropriate sensitivity and consideration of
existing users' water rights, and at the same time provides a realistic
basis for measuring tribal entitlements."
Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated that part of the
September 1988 order that established PIA as the standard for
reserving federal water rights on Indian reservations, instead requiring
courts to grant water rights to Indian reservations based on a case-bycase basis. The court affirmed the remainder of the order.
KatharineJEllison
CALIFORNIA
Deltakeeper v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., No. C035745, 2001 Cal. App.
LEXIS 3687 (Cal. App. Dec. 26, 2001) (when certain unnamed parties
to litigation are protected by the interests of named parties, dismissal
of a case is not necessary under the rules of indispensable parties and
necessary parties).
Oakdale Irrigation District ("Oakdale"), South San Joaquin
Irrigation District ("South San Joaquin") and Stockton East Water
District ("Stockton East"), entered into the Joint District Water
Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") with the City of Stockton, Lincoln
Village Maintenance District, Colonial Heights Maintenance District,
and Central San Joaquin Water Conservation District, for the sale of
water by Oakdale and South San Joaquin to the other parties to the
Agreement.
Oakdale and South San Joaquin prepared an
Environmental Impact Report ("EIR"), which Deltakeeper challenged
by a petition for a writ of mandate. On August 26, 1999, Deltakeeper
filed a petition for writ of mandamus alleging the EIR failed to address
adequately the environmental impacts of the project proposed in the
Agreement. They requested the setting aside of the certification of the
EIR and a permanent injunction enjoining respondents from
engaging in any activity connected with the project until the project
approvals fully complied with the California Environmental Quality
Act ("CEQA"). The Oakdale, South San Joaquin, and Stockton East
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Districts filed a motion to dismiss the petition on December 13, 1999
for failure to join indispensable parties.
The court determined whether the unnamed parties are necessary
parties or indispensable parties to the litigation, under section 389 of
the Public Resources Code of California. Section 389 mandates that
whenever feasible, the person materially interested in the subject of an
action should be joined as a necessary party so they may be heard.
This section insures that complete, not hollow, relief will be had by all
interested parties, the protection of parties whose joinder is in
question, and a party is not subject, after the adjudication, to double
or otherwise inconsistent liability. The court here found that the EIR
ensured complete relief for all the interested parties. Secondly, the
court found the unnamed parties did not lose protection of their
interests when the joined parties had the same interest in the
litigation. All parties have voting rights under the Agreement before
any action is taken which binds the named parties to the outcome of
the vote. Finally, the parties will not be threatened with double or
inconsistent liability because any of them may cancel the Agreement if
the EIR is determined to be inadequate.
The next issue was whether a necessary party to the action is
indispensable. A party is indispensable only in the conclusory sense
that in its absence, the court has decided the action should be
dismissed. Ordinarily courts refuse to adjudicate a contract case when
all parties to the action are not present. The fact that the action may
affect the interests of the non-joined parties in the underlying contract
in this case does not dictate the conclusion they are indispensable
parties. The rights asserted in this litigation are independent of the
contractual rights to water established by the Agreement. An
indispensable party is determined by four factors: (1) whether the
judgment is prejudicial to parties or non-parties; (2) whether any
prejudice be lessened or avoided, (3) whether the judgment will be
adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy
if the action is dismissed. First, the court decided the non-joined
parties had interests in the litigation but the parties to the action
adequately, protected the interests. Second, the unnamed parties
could make no new arguments since a determination of an EIR's
adequacy was based on the existence of substantial evidence and any
party could make this argument. Third, any judgment rendered will
adequately adjudicate the rights of all parties. Fourth, if the action was
dismissed Deltakeeper would have no recourse because the statute of
limitations had run forjoining more parties.
Finally, the court found that if the action were dismissed, the
evaluation of the EIR would escape scrutiny, the main recourse the
public has to ensure projects comply with CEQA. Therefore, the court
did not dismiss the case.
ShandraDobrovolny

